Questionable Payments by Foreign Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 by Lenczowski, Hubert
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 3
Number 1 Fall 1979 Article 6
1-1-1979
Questionable Payments by Foreign Subsidiaries:
The Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Effect of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
Hubert Lenczowski
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hubert Lenczowski, Questionable Payments by Foreign Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Effect of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 3 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 151 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol3/iss1/6
Questionable Payments by Foreign
Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial
Jurisdictional Effect of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
By HUBERT LENCZOWSKI
Member of the Class of 1980
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19771 amended the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 by establishing new rules of mandatory in-
ternal record keeping, and by prohibiting certain corporate payments
to specified foreign officials. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) is legislation of crucial importance to all issuers of securities.?
Its amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act have come to be
seen by many as the most significant regulatory initiative imposed upon
the internal workings of American corporations since the Security Ex-
change Act itself was enacted.3 Yet, for legislation which imposes such
important regulatory requirements, the FCPA is plagued by ambiguity
and imprecision.
The purpose and scope of this Note is to analyze only one aspect
of this apparent ambiguity and to ascertain its legality: the extent of
the FCPA's international reach. In exploring the FCPA's application,
this Note will outline and explain the provisions of the Act, and ex-
amine the way in which the FCPA is applied internationally. This
analysis will show that the FCPA has a bifurcated international appli-
cation. First, the corrupt practices of American citizens and corpora-
tions abroad are directly within the FCPA's scope and within the
personal jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
Second, the Act's provisions are applied indirectly to foreign subsidiar-
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 30A, 78q(b) [hereinafter cited
as FCPA]. See appendix to this Note.
2. For an excellent discussion of the general problem see N. JACOBY, P. NEHlMKIS &
R EELS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS (1977). See also Atkeson, 7he
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977" 4n International Application of SEC's Corporate Gov-
ernance Reform, 12 INT'L LAW. 703, 719 (1978).
3. This conclusion was suggested by the accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,
USA. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, USA, The Week in Review, (Aug. 18, 1978).
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ies of American companies through the imposition of liability on the
parent corporations for improper payments made by their foreign sub-
sidiaries.
After examining the Act's provisions, and how they are applied
internationally, this analysis will address the question of whether this
extraterritorial application of American law is consistent with the judi-
cial precedent governing international applications of American law as
they are embodied in the antitrust and trade regulation laws. A com-
parison of the pre-FCPA principles of jurisdiction with the interna-
tional application of the FCPA will indicate that its reach and effect are
in fact unprecedented extensions of the jurisdiction of American tribu-
nals because these extensions are not constrained by the more tradi-
tional perimeters of objective territoriality.
The Act's Requirements
The FCPA contains three distinct provisions which purport to reg-
ulate three areas of activity affecting all American businesses engaged
in foreign activities. These are (1) "Accounting Standards," (2) "For-
eign Corrupt Practices by Issuers," and (3) "Foreign Corrupt Practices
by Domestic Concerns." The following is a brief review of those por-
tions of the FCPA which are relevant to the jurisdictional issues ex-
amined herein.
(1) Accounting Standards
Section 102 of the FCPA, entitled "Accounting Standards,"
amends section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and ap-
plies to all issuers which have a section 12 class of securities, or are
required to file section 15(d) reports with the SEC.4 Specifically, the
Act requires that these issuers maintain "books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
4. Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sets forth rules governing registra.
tion of securities traded on national securities exchanges. Section 12 registration is separate
and distinct from the registration of a newly issued security under the Securities Act of 1934,
Every issuer that is engaged in interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by the use
of the mails, and which has assets of over $1,000,000, and a class of equity securities held of
record by five hundred persons, must register their securities by filing with the Commission
a registration statement.
Under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, each issuer must file with
the Commission supplementary and periodic information, documents, and reports as may
be required pursuant to section 13 or in respect of a security registered pursuant to section 12
of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78a etseq.; [19781 EXCHANGE AcT REG. REP. (CCH) 23,291,
25,141.
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tions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." Issuers must main-
tain a system of internal control which assures that (1) management
authorizes transactions, (2) transactions are recorded, (3) access to as-
sets is permitted only with management authorization, and (4) assets
are accounted for at reasonable intervals.'
These provisions governing accounting standards are the vehicle
by which the SEC supervises and enforces section 103 of the FCPA,
entitled "Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers." As the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Report that accompa-
nied the Senate Bill states, "the accounting standards in S.305 [the
FCPA] are intended to operate in tandem with the criminalization pro-
visions of the bill to deter corporate bribery."' This statement suggests
the conclusion that the failure of a parent company to report prohibited
activities of a foreign subsidiary to the SEC will subject the parent to
the criminal liability provisions of section 103.7
(2) Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers
Section 103 of the FCPA is an addition to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and applies to section 12 issuers, and issuers filing reports
under section 15(d).8 Section 103 imposes criminal liability on an is-
suer's officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder who, "acting on
behalf of such issuer," makes use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce "corruptly9 in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money,". . . "or anything of value" to "any foreign official," "any for-
eign political party," or "any person while knowing or having reason to
know that. . . such money... will be offered.., in order to assist
such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person."10 (emphasis added.) Payments to foreign
government officials with "essentially ministerial or clericar' duties are
5. FCPA § 102 (2)(A)(B).
6. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUsING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT To
ACCOMPANY S.305, SEN. REP. No. 95-114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
7. Id.
8. Supra note 4.
9. Although the FCPA does not use the word "intent," the word "corrupt" is used to
imply that corrupt intent is required for liability. As the Senate Report states, "the word
'corruptly' connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongly influence the recipient."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10. Yet, the word "intent" was purposefully avoided,
because, as this note explains, the FCPA's standard for liability more closely approximates
strict liability than a standard requiring intent. (See text accompanying note 26, infra).
10. FCPA § 103(a)(2)(8).
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not proscribed by section 103.11
The penalty for violating section 103 may involve fines of up to
$1,000,000 for corporate issuers, and for offending officers, imprison-
ment of up to five years, in addition to maximum fines of $10,000.12
Section 103 gives the Securities Exchange Commission jurisdiction to
enforce the FCPA's criminal and civil sanctions pertaining to issuers
whenever issuers or their employees use the mails or any instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce in furtherance of proscribed acts.'
3
(3) Foreign Corrufpt Practices By Domestic Concerns
In contrast to the rules governing issuers, section 104 of the FCPA,
"Foreign Corrupt Practices by Domestic Concerns," is not an amend-
ment to the Securities Exchange Act and hence is not enforced by the
Securities Exchange Commission.14 Section 104 is a separate law en-
forced by the Justice Department. 15
Section 104 defines a domestic concern as any individual who is a
citizen, national, or resident of the United States, or as any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincor-
porated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the
laws of the United States.' 6 The FCPA imposes on domestic concerns
the same rules that it imposes upon issuers in section 103. 17 Domestic
concerns may not offer, promise, or pay anything of value to a foreign
official, political party, or a person whom the domestic concern has rea-
son to know will influence a foreign official or party, in order to assist
that domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business, or in directing
business to any person.' 8 As in section 103, it is only foreign officials
above a ministerial or clerical rank who may not receive beneficences
from domestic concerns.19 Any violation of these provisions by a do-
mestic concern shall result in penalties in the form of fines of up to
$1,000,000. In addition, the Attorney General is empowered to file a
civil action to enjoin the proscribed act. Individuals willfully acting on
behalf of the domestic concern may be fined up to $10,000, and are
I1. FCPA § 103(b).
12. FCPA § 103(c)(1)(2)(3).
13. FCPA § 103(a).
14., FCPA § 104(c).
15. FCPA § 104(a); (d)(3).
16. FCPA § 104(d).
17. Compare FCPA § 104(a) with FCPA § 103(a).
18. FCPA § 104(a)(1)(A)(B).
19. FCPA § 104(d)(2).
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subject to five years of imprisonment.2 °
A Statutory Interpretation of the FCPA's International Application
The broad scope and sweeping language of the FCPA has been the
subject of substantial criticism by those opponents of the Act who re-
gard it as an ambiguous and undesirable regulatory intrusion into the
affairs of business. The Act has also been criticized by advocates of
even more exacting legislation designed to curtail corrupt practices and
the corrupt use of corporate funds. Criticisms of the Act typically are
related to the lack of definite legal standards and the use of terms
which are legally imprecise.2 '
Additional ambiguity arises in connection with the jurisdictional
scope of the Act. From the title alone one may discern that the United
States, through the Act, prohibits "corrupt" payments made in connec-
tion with international transactions. The Act clearly has an interna-
tional application and effect. Any proscribed payment made by issuers
or domestic concerns in a foreign country will subject the issuer or do-
mestic concern to the jurisdiction of United States courts. What is not
clear is to whom the FCPA applies extraterritorially.
The FCPA specifically states that its jurisdictional coverage ex-
tends to any "United States citizen, national, or resident," or person
"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' 2 Superfi-
cially this appears to be a precise statement of the FCPA's inpersonam
jurisdictional application. But ambiguity is caused by the omission of
any provision governing the Act's application to American-owned for-
eign subsidiaries. Since ownership of foreign subsidiary corporations
has become one of the preeminent methods by which American corpo-
20. FCPA § 104(b)(1)(A)(B)(2)(a); (c).
21. The Act's central feature eliciting criticism by its proponents and opponents alike is
its legal ambiguity. For example, opponents contend that the absence of a rule as to when a
ministerial bureaucrat becomes a "foreign official" creates paralyzing uncertainty as to an
issuer's legal liability. Also, opponents contend that the "reason to know" provision can
logically be extended so as to impose criminal liability on an issuer that is merely doing
business in a foreign country in which it is commonly known that business is conducted with
less rigorous moral standards than those which exist in the United States.
Proponents of greater control have voiced criticisms of the FCPA's blanket allowance
of payments to foreign government employees in ministerial and clerical positions because it
is thought that this is a wide open "loophole" through which the Act may be completely
emasculated. See, Stabler, SEC'S New IVeapo" Foreign Bribery.4c Inoses Tough Rules
on the Bookkeeping of All Public Firms, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1978 at 30, col.1. See also
Estey & Marston, Pifalls (and Loopholes) in the Foreign Bribery, Law, FORTUNE, October 9,
1978, at 182, 184.
22. FCPA § 103(c)(3).
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rations transact business abroad,2 3 the FCPA's failure to address the
legal liability and status of the foreign subsidiary is remarkable. If for-
eign subsidiaries of American businesses are not included within the
jurisdictional scope of the FCPA, it would seem possible that these for-
eign entities, acting on behalf of their parent companies, could circum-
vent the Act because United States jurisdiction would not extend to
cover them.
Despite the Act's omission of provisions governing foreign subsidi-
aries, it provides for an unprecedented, indirect application of United
States criminal and civil law to acts committed outside the borders of
the United States by foreign entities, without direct imposition of crimi-
nal liability on the foreign subsidiary. The explanatory statement ac-
companying the Congressional Conference Report to the FCPA
expressly disavows the extraterritorial application of United States per-
sonal jurisdiction to foreign entities. This is true even though their im-
proper payments may clearly come within the Act's grant of subject
matter jurisdiction.24 "The conferees recognized the inherent jurisdic-
tional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion
of foreign subsidiaries of United States companies in the direct prohibi-
tions of the bill."25 (emphasis added.)
This statement is correct in its assertion that the direct provisions
of the bill have not extended United States personal jurisdiction to for-
eign entities. Through its masterful imprecision, Congress has ven-
tured as close as possible to extending the personal jurisdiction of the
SEC to foreign subsidiaries by creating liability in the parent-issuer for
the acts of its foreign subsidiary, an entity which by itself cannot violate
American laws. This imposition of liability on the parent-issuer ex-
plains the FCPA's bifurcated and extraterritorial application.
First, under the provisions of section 103, a parent-issuer that
makes proscribed direct payments itself clearly is liable under that sec-
tion. Second, the Act does not extend the SEC's jurisdiction to foreign
subsidiaries directly, but instead reaches the American parent-issuer for
its failure to control its subsidiary. The mechanism which extends the
23. There are over 5,000 majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. companies engaged in
manufacturing, petroleum exploration and production, trade, and mining and smelting.
These foreign affiliates will make $35.2 billion in capital expenditures in 1979. Chung, Capi'
talExpenditures by Majoriy Owned Foreign.4ffliates of U.S. Companies, 1978 and, 1979, 59
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 32 (1979).
24. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES CONFERENCE REPORT (to accompany S.305) JOINT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE REPORT No. 95-831, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
25. Id.
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criminal liability to American parent-issuers for the foreign acts of for-
eign entities is the phrase "reason to know."
Under sections 102 and 103 a parent-issuer is damned if it reports,
and it is damned if it fails to report. A failure to report on corrupt
payments by subsidiaries constitutes a failure to comply with the ex-
press demands of section 102 that require management to exercise ade-
quate control over assets, and criminal liability ensues. If, however, an
issuer reports on improper payments under section 102, then it may be
inferred that the parent-issuer had "reason to know" about the pay-
ment. If the parent-issuer had "reason to know", then the criminal
sanctions of section 103 may obtain because one must only have "rea-
son to know" that a proscribed payment will be made "to any person"
to have violated the law.
Although section 103 states that the mails or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce must be used "corruptly" in furtherance of a pro-
scribed payment or offer, the word "corrupt" is undefined in the Act.
The Senate report indicates that "corrupt" is not synonymous with in-
tent, but that the word "corrupt" merely "connotes" an evil motive or
purpose.26 Section 103 provides that if instrumentalities of interstate
commerce are used "corruptly" in furtherance of a payment while
"knowing or having reason to know" that an offer or payment will be
made to obtain business, then criminal liability will ensue. Yet, be-
cause the word "corrupt" is not synonymous with intent and is unde-
fined in the Act, the fact that one only needs to have "reason to know"
of a proscribed payment indicates that the word "corrupt," as it is used
in the Act, is equivalent to merely having "reason to know" that a pay-
ment or offer will be made to procure business.
Followed to its logical conclusion, this means that whenever busi-
ness is conducted in a country in which the government officials above
a clerical rank are known to be corrupt, there exists "reason to know"
that "any person" engaging in business in that country on behalf of the
parent-issuer will be required to make a payment in order to obtain,
retain, or simply conduct business. If an instrumentality of interstate
commerce is used "in furtherance of' such business, there is "reason to
know" that proscribed activity will occur. This constitutes "corrupt"
use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce for which
criminal liability may be imposed.
The legislative history of the Act further substantiates this inter-
pretation, Senate Bill S.305, which was later amended in conference,
26. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
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proposed that the FCPA's imposition of liability for the falsification of
corporate books and records and the making of misleading representa-
tions to auditors was "not intended to make unlawful conduct which is
merely negligent." 27 For this reason the Senate proposed that knowl-
edge connoting a "conscious undertaking" in the falsification of records
or misleading of auditors would be required for liability under section
102.28 The House amendment had no comparable provision, and the
Senate acceded to the House in conference committee, deleting Mke
knowledge requirement from the final version.29 Therefore, the parent-
issuer that reports financial information of its foreign subsidiary to the
SEC on a separate or consolidated basis with its own financial informa-
tion as required by section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
may be held liable for either consciously or negligently failing to
"make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer" in that these books fail to indicate payments
designated as improper under section 103.30
The imposition of liability on the parent-issuer for both conscious
and unconscious omissions reaffirms the FCPA's indirect application.
The conscious and therefore "corrupt" failure by parent-issuers to re-
port on improper payments of their subsidiaries will result in a viola-
tion of section 102. Violations of section 102 will direct the attention of
the SEC to the underlying section 103 violations. Unconscious or neg-
ligent failure of the parent to report its subsidiaries' improper payment
also violates section 102. If the subsidiary makes a corrupt payment
which the parent-issuer negligently or unconsciously fails to report, but
which is detected by the SEC through section 102 violations, then the
parent is deemed to have had "reason to know" of the payment,
thereby violating section 103.31
The FCPA therefore creates indirect liability as to parent-issuers
because they may be held criminally liable for failing to report acts
committed abroad without their knowledge or consent by a foreign en-
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id.
29. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 10.
30. FCPA §'102(2)(A). See also id. at 14, and supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. The Senate Report acknowledges this when it stated that "a U.S. Company which
'looks the other way' in order to be able to raise the defense that they were ignorant of bribes
made by a foreign subsidiary, could be in violation of section 102 requiring companies to
devise and maintain adequate accounting controls." SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
John Estey and David Marston term the direct/indirect bifurcated application of the FCPA
a "neat double whanuny." Estey & Marston, supra note 21, at 183.
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tity, which itself cannot violate AmeriCdan law. Thus, one commenta-
tor's glib remark seems to have some truth: "Under the new Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, it is becoming clear, you don't have to be either
operating in foreign lands or corrupt to be in trouble."3 2
Since section 104 domestic concerns do not report to the SEC
under section 15 of the 1934 Act, nor issue section 12 class securities,
they do not have to comply with the accounting standards of section
102. Hence, this bifurcated application cannot apply to section 104 do-
mestic concerns. Section 104 is an independent body of law enforced
by the Justice Department. A domestic concern's foreign subsidiary
could make payments considered "improper" under section 104, but as
long as the domestic concern did not use the mails or any instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce to authorize or instruct the payment, it
would not be liable under the Act. This would be true even if it knew
of or authorized its subsidiary's "improper" payment because none of
the Act's prohibitions would have been violated, and thus, the subsidi-
ary's payment would not be improper under section 104. The potential
for a domestic concern to evade the provisions of the FCPA appears to
be great as long as the Justice Department's jurisdiction is not invoked.
Several conclusions may be drawn from this. First, Congress,
through the FCPA, has extended the SEC's jurisdiction internationally
by designating certain payments made abroad as being proscribed by
the Act. Second, Congress reaffirmed in the FCPA that the SEC and
the Justice Department have personal jurisdiction over United States
citizens, nationals, and residents for acts committed abroad which are
in violation of American laws. Third, Congress has refused to extend
personal jurisdiction to include foreign entities such as subsidiaries di-
rectly within the scope of the Act. Fourth, despite this, the FCPA will
hold American issuers liable for acts committed outside the United
States by foreign entities, which themselves, presumably, cannot violate
American municipal law. The following analysis will show that the
first three conclusions reached above are not unprecedented in terms of
previous international applications of American law, but that the last
conclusion is unprecedented in terms of its effect and inclusionary
breadth.
So far there has been little judicial interpretation of the FCPA. A
possible explanation might be that all potential parties to such an ac-
tion, including businesses, the SEC, and the Justice Department, are
approaching their new duties under the Act with a caution commensu-
32. Stabler, supra note 21.
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rate with the Act's legal uncertainties."
The Status of International Applications of
American Law Until The FCPA
According to traditional notions of international law, the usual ba-
ses of a state's jurisdiction are territoriality and nationality.3 4 Justice
Holmes in American Banana found the extent of a state's jurisdiction to
be limited by strict territoriality. That case stands for the proposition
that the lawfulness of an act can be determined only by the state in
which the act occurred; otherwise principles of comity would be vio-
lated.35
Nationality also has been recognized as a fundamental basis of
criminal jurisdiction. Joseph Brierly, in his treatise The Law of Na-
tions, acknowledges this in stating "that a state may assume jurisdic-
tion over offenses committed by its own nationals abroad ... .
William Fugate in his treatise Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust
Laws stated that: "the jurisdiction of a state over its own citizens,
wherever they may be, has been generally recognized.
37
Departures from the strict jurisdictional applications based on ter-
ritoriality and nationality can be found in the international applica-
33. Only four cases have appeared which involve the FCPA. SEC v. Dresser Industries,
453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Page Airways, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,
393; SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc. 1978 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 469 (N.D. 111. Aug. 30, 1978);
SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., No. 78-0410 (D.D.C. May 24, 1978). The Kaly complaint
is the only one as of Jan. 1, 1979, to allege bribery in violation of section 103. It is interesting
to note that the SEC's complaints against Page, Aminex and Dresser were based on alleged
violations of the FCPA's accounting requirements and were not based directly on the
FCPA's proscriptions against corrupt payments. Despite the paucity of cases involving the
FCPA, there is evidence that the SEC intends to aggressively enforce it to its legal and
logical conclusions: As of December 1, 1978, 25 enforcement actions were initiated by the
SEC against companies involved with questionable payments. These actions were not pros-
ecuted under the FCPA but under other SEC disclosure requirements such as 10(b)5. More-
over, the SEC issued two rules involving the FCPA effective on March 23, 1979). (SEC
Release 34-15570).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
35. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 218 (4th ed. 1949). See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 34, at §§ 17, 18.
37. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as W. FUGATE]. Fugate's statement was made while discussing Bulova Watch Co,
v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1952) afl'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952), a case where a United
States citizen's acts in Mexico were found to have violated American laws. See also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 30.
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tions of the antitrust laws. In the Alcoa case,31 the Second Circuit
found a violation of the Sherman Act in a contract between two foreign
parties, made in a foreign country, and which, by its terms, did not
involve the United States.3 9 The justification for extending American
jurisdiction to foreign acts of foreign entities is known as the "effects
doctrine," and has become established orthodoxy within the American
legal system.' The United States recognizes that acts committed by
foreigners in foreign countries, which have the effect of violating crimi-
nal proscriptions within the United States, are subject to United States'
jurisdiction.4 This principle of "objective territoriality" considers that
the country affected by the foreign act assumes "objective territorial
jurisdiction," whereas the country in which the act took place has "sub-
jective territorial jurisdiction."42
"Objective territoriality," which may appear to be an extraterrito-
rial exercise of jurisdiction, nevertheless has logical theoretical founda-
tions that rest upon territoriality. American commentators on the
principle of objective territoriality and its relation to the antitrust laws
have distinguished between the "international" effect of an act pro-
scribed by law and the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. In com-
menting upon foreign activities which affect United States foreign
commerce, Fugate noted that in assuming jurisdiction over acts and
contracts abroad our courts have not purported to exercise extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, but only jurisdiction over acts which operate within
the United States territory.43 Thus, according to this prevailing view, it
is the objective situs and operative effect of an act which allows the
invocation of United States jurisdiction, thus providing an "interna-
tional" effect to American law. An invocation of United States juris-
diction without a foreign act having requisite objective territorial situs
in the United States would constitute an "extraterritorial" exercise of
American jurisdiction, and hence be contrary to all notions of jurisdic-
tion: nationality, territoriality, and objective territoriality."
38. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
39. The latest development of the Alcoa "effects doctrine" is found in Timbeflane Lum-
ber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
40. Although the "effects doctrine," or principle of objective territoriality, has been rec-
ognized to the extent of being expressed in section 18 of the REsTATmEmT, not all nations
recognize this particularly far-reaching extension of the concept of jurisdiction. See West-
inghouse, note 65 infra.
41. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 219.
42. Id.
43. W. FUGATE, supra note 37, at 73.
44. W. FUGATE, supra note 37, does not refer to United States jurisdictional applica-
tions to foreign acts of foreign persons as being "extraterritorial," but rather as "interna-
No. 1]
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The FCPA: Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Exercise or Effect?
The FCPA's direct application to United States domiciled issuers
and domestic concerns under sections 103 and 104 of the Act for mak-
ing proscribed payments is consistent with American legal precedent
involving the "effects doctrine." The FCPA specifically prohibits in-
tentional offers to pay, or payments to a foreign official or party or to
any person who will pay a foreign official or party in order to assist in
obtaining, retaining, or directing business to the payor.45 There is no
requirement that the offer or payment be made abroad. Use of any
instrumentality of interstate commerce will suffice to invoke the SEC's
or Justice Department's jurisdiction.46
If the illegal act is committed within the United States, the princi-
ple of territoriality permits United States' courts to assert personal ju-
risdiction over the offending party. If the illegal payment or act is
made abroad, the Act's jurisdictional extension to "United States citi-
zens, nationals or residents"47 is consonant with the concept ofjurisdic-
tion based on nationality. Thus, the direct implementation of the
FCPA constitutes an "international" application of United States mu-
nicipal law that has an extraterritorial effect. It does not constitute a
direct extraterritorial exercise of American jurisdiction.48
This conclusion is technically true of the indirect application of the
FCPA. A parent-issuer that fails to report the proscribed payments of
a subsidiary under section 102 will be directly liable for those prohib-
ited acts of its subsidiary. The FCPA, however, does not extend per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary as the Act purports to
extend its coverage only to United States citizens, nationals, or resi-
dents. In fact, the House version of S.305 contained a provision which
included American controlled foreign subsidiaries within the ambit of
the FCPA. But, in conference, the House acceded to the Senate's re-
tional." By any definition of the word "extraterritorial," United States jurisdiction is in fact
being applied extraterritorially. One would think that such semantic gymnastics, performed
in order not to offend technical constructions of principles of international law, would defer
to reality by an acknowledgement such as in RESTATEMENT § 10, that a nation's jurisdiction
may be based on "protection of certain state interests" other than nationality and territorial-
ity. In deference to precedent and the current orthodoxy's jargon, this note does not deviate
from this academic "paradigm." Compare KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIric
REVOLUTIONS with Extraterritorial Effect Section of the Antitrust Laws, A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L. §§ 65-103 (1957).
45. FCPA § 103(a)(2)(b).
46. FCPA § 103(a).
47. FCPA § 103(C)(3).
48. See notes 43, 44 supra.
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fusal to extend the SEC's personal jurisdiction to foreign subsidiaries. 49
Thus, the FCPA's indirect application to foreign subsidiaries via par-
ent-issuers is not a dejure, but a defacto application. The FCPA ex-
pressly exempts foreign subsidiaries, but nevertheless parent-issuers
seeking to avoid violations of the FCPA will compel their subsidiaries
to abide by its terms. This indirect application of the FCPA to foreign
subsidiaries avoids offending traditional jurisdictional principles of na-
tionality and territoriality because its dejure jurisdictional application
extends only to parent-issuers who are "nationals" operating within the
United States. Thus, this indirect application of the FCPA has only an
extraterritorial jurisdictional effect, and any extraterritorial jurisdic-
tional exercise is expressly disallowed.
Despite the fact that neither the direct nor the indirect application
of the FCPA constitutes a technical extraterritorial exercise ofjurisdic-
tion, the central issue of concern raised by the FCPA's application is
whether the effect of the Act's indirect application to foreign subsidiar-
ies is contrary to the logic and purposes embodied in the principles of
United States law governing jurisdiction. The actual effect of the indi-
rect application of the FCPA to foreign subsidiaries is twofold. First,
the American parent-issuer may be held liable for its foreign subsidiar-
ies' foreign acts that may have no operative effect within the United
States. Second, in seeking to avoid liability, the American parent-is-
suer will require its foreign subsidiary to comply with the Act's provi-
sions, assuming that the parent has control over its subsidiary. The
logical effect of applying the FCPA indirectly to the foreign subsidiary
through the parent is as if American prescriptive jurisdiction were exer-
cised to hold the foreign subsidiary directly accountable to the pro-
scriptions of the FCPA. Although the FCPA's de jure enforcement
provision does not extend to impose criminal liability on the foreign
entity,50 the effect of the FCPA's application is that of a defacto exer-
cise of the SEC's prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially.
The FCPA's Effect: Unprecedented Inclusionary Breadth
The international application of American antitrust laws is exem-
plified by Watchmakers of Switzerland,5' in which the service of proc-
ess on an American company's Swiss subsidiary was upheld as a valid
exercise of jurisdiction. The rationale for the ruling was that "juris-
49. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 13-14.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 40, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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diction over the parent is not being sought through a subsidiary, but
jurisdiction of the subsidiary is being sought through the parent.' ",52
According to Brewster, this "stands as a warning that separate incorpo-
ration of foreign subsidiaries does not assure their immunity from the
process of American courts."53 The legal justification behind American
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign entities under the
antitrust laws is the "effects doctrine": the illegal effect within United
States territory of the foreign entity's act. 4 Thus, the limits to the reach
of the antitrust laws' jurisdiction are defined by the principle of objec-
tive territoriality as manifested by the "effects doctrine," which permits
the extension of criminal liability to foreign acts of foreign entities pro-
vided that the act's operative effect is to violate American law.
The Justice Department acknowledged the limits to the antitrust
laws' purpose and jurisdictional reach when stating:
to apply the Sherman Act to a combination of U.S. finns for foreign
activities which have no direct or intended effect on U.S. consumers
or export opportunities would, we believe, extend the Act beyond the
scope Congress must have intended. This could encroach upon the
sovereignty of a foreign state without any overriding justification
based on legitimate United States interests.
55
When the House of Representatives acceded to the Senate's refusal
to extend personal jurisdiction directly to foreign subsidiaries, the Con-
gressional conferees went on record as "recogniz[ing] the inherent juris-
dictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the
inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies within the direct
provisions of the bill."' 56 The difficulty, to which the conferees
obliquely referred, is that an extension of personal jurisdiction to for-
eign entities for their foreign acts, which probably would have no oper-
ative effect on United States commerce, would violate the well
recognized principle that United States laws do not have any applica-
tion in foreign territory absent an effect upon United States foreign
commerce.57 Thus, in seeking to avoid a jurisdictional "difficulty" that
would violate principles of objective territoriality, Congress was un-
doubtedly aware of its creation of a jurisdictional subterfuge: the effect
52. Quotedin K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINFSS ABROAD 60 (1958).
53. Id. at 61.
54. See note 44 supra.
55. ANTITRUST AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS GUIDE FROM THE U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, [1977] 7 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Number 266, Feb. 1, 1977 [hereinafter
cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
56. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 14.
57. W. FUGATE, supra note 37, at 29.
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of the indirect application of the FCPA to foreign subsidiaries through
the parent-issuer would be a defacto extraterritorial exercise of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction which would avoid a technical violation of princi-
ples of nationality, territoriality, and objective territoriality by not
extending dejure enforcement jurisdiction to hold the foreign entity
criminally liable for its acts. Thus, the effect of the indirect application
of the FCPA transcends and runs contrary to the jurisdictional limits
imposed by principles of objective territoriality. The potential imposi-
tion of liability on American parent-issuers for the "corrupt acts" of
their foreign subsidiaries, which possibly do not violate American law,
together with the indirect application of the record -keeping require-
ments to foreign subsidiaries through the parents, is in effect a jurisdic-
tional extension of unprecedented inclusionary breadth. Not even the
antitrust laws are extended to this extent.5
Conflicts, Sovereignty and Comity
The FCPA's effect of holding the parent-issuer criminally liable
for the extraterritorial acts of a foreign subsidiary, and the FCPA's im-
position of its bookkeeping and corporate conduct provisions on the
foreign subsidiary through the parent, not only run counter to princi-
ples of nationality and territoriality, but also do violence to principles
of comity, national sovereignty and the laws of conflicts.
No challenge to an extension of personal jurisdiction under the
FCPA in American courts will be forthcoming from foreign subsidiar-
ies because they are expressly not covered by the Act. The situation
may arise, however, in which an American parent-issuer will challenge
the FCPA's indirect application requiring the parent to compel the sub-
sidiary to adhere to section 102 record-keeping requirements, and to
comply with the section 103 standards of corporate conduct. Such
challenges would inevitably be based upon principles of comity, na-
tional sovereignty, and conflicts of law.
The FCPA has the effect of intruding upon a foreign nation's sov-
ereignty whenever a foreign subsidiary adheres to the FCPA's book-
keeping requirements of section 102 and the standards of corporate
conduct set forth in section 103. By holding American parent-issuers
criminally liable for improper payments made by their foreign subsidi-
aries, the FCPA indirectly does compel the foreign entities to adhere to
the Act's bookkeeping and corporate conduct provisions, a situation
which may seriously interfere with the basic sovereignty of a foreign
58. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 55.
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nation.5 9
The fact that the FCPA does not extend personal jurisdiction to
cover foreign subsidiaries precludes a defure extraterritorial extension
of the Act's provisions, thereby avoiding a technical violation of princi-
ples of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, the defaclo exercise of the
FCPA's provisions compels a foreign entity to perform an act in a for-
eign nation, which is contrary to that nation's sovereign exercise of
power. For these reasons, while the FCPA's jurisdictional exercise
does not constitute a dejure violation of principles of national sover-
eignty, it does amount to a defacto intrusion upon a foreign nation's
sovereignty and thus violates principles of comity. If the foreign sub-
sidiary is partly owned by a sovereign government, the FCPA's effect of
compelling the foreign government to comply with the Act's provisions
would be a very substantive indirect encroachment on that nation's
sovereignty, and may result in a serious conflict of sovereign powers.
A foreign nation's sovereignty may be further offended by the
FCPA insofar as the effect of the Act's indirect application to the for-
eign subsidiary conflicts with the laws of that country. The most likely
example of such a conflict would be a situation in which a foreign sub-
sidiary makes political contributions that are legal under the laws of
the foreign country, but which are proscribed by section 103 of the
FCPA. Because the American parent-issuer may be held criminally li-
able60 for knowing and reporting its subsidiary's payment or for failing
to report the subsidiary's payments that are deemed illegal by the
FCPA, the parent-issuer will compel its foreign subsidiary to adhere to
the provisions of the FCPA and abstain from making political contri-
butions that are legal in the foreign country.
A basic principle of conflicts of law as stated by Fugate is that "a
court may order the doing of an act outside its territory provided it is
not contrary to the laws of the country in which it is to be per-
formed.' Conversely, United States law that is contrary to the law of
the country in which it is to be applied is invalid in principle. Although
the FCPA's dejure prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is not ex-
tended directly to foreign entities, 62 the fact that the American parent-
issuer will require its foreign subsidiary to adhere to the FCPA's stan-
dards of corporate conduct and abstain from making political contribu-
59. G. STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 99-101 (3d ed. 1963), cited n RESTATEMENT,
supra note 34, at § 40, Reporter's Note 2.
60. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
61. W. FUGATE, supra note 37, at 129.
62. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 49.
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tions has the effect of a defacto prescriptive jurisdictional exercise,
which is obviously in conflict with the foreign country's laws which
permit political contributions.
According to section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States,
[wihere two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of
each of the states, (b) the extent and nature of the hardship that in-
consistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (3)
the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the terri-
tory of the other state, (d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the
extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.63
The record of the "international" application of American anti-
trust law reflects serious conflicts with foreign laws and other nations'
sovereignty. The Department of Justice acknowledges that "in general,
foreign firms, including state-owned or controlled firms, will be ex-
pected to observe the prohibitions of our antitrust laws."" These far
reaching jurisdictional extensions of the antitrust laws may be justified,
however, by section 40. The primary justification is found in the Amer-
ican national interest of promoting economic competition, which over-
rides most considerations of comity towards other nations. The
antitrust laws' international extension, however, is always bounded by
ascertainable jurisdictional limits defined by the operative illegal effects
of foreign acts within the United States or on its commerce.
Although justifiable under the Restatement definition of comity,
and although bound by the requirement that illegal effects must exist to
invoke their jurisdiction, the antitrust laws' "international" extensions
have been met with opprobrium even by those foreign governments
which adhere to general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions. The House of Lords in the Westinghouse decision expressed the
British policy against recognizing the extension of American extraterri-
torial jurisdiction against British companies:
For many years now the United States has sought to exercise
63. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, at § 40. See also ANTrrRusT GUIDE, supra note
55, at 51.
64. ANTrrRUST GUIDE, supra note 55, at 9.
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jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done outside the juris-
diction of that country. This is not in accordance with international
law and has led to legislation on the part of other states, including
the United Kingdom, designed to protect their nationals from crimi-
nal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction by
those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion of sovereignty.
65
Although Congress, in designing the FCPA, cleverly avoided tech-
nical offenses to principles of international law by not extending pre-
scriptive and enforcement jruisdiction directly, and thus de jre, to
include foreign subsidiaries, the effect of the FCPA constitutes a de
facto exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction directly to the foreign subsidi-
ary, in addition to a defacto exercise of enforcement jurisdiction indi-
rectly to the parent for the acts of its subsidiary. By requiring the
parent to compel its subsidiary to adhere to the FCPA's bookkeeping
requirements and standards of corporate conduct, the FCPA's defacto
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is not constrained by principles of
objective territoriality, as are the antitrust laws, which would not per-
mit the extension of prescriptive jurisdiction to include foreign acts of
foreign entities which have no operative illegal effect within United
States territory.
Conclusion
The FCPA's extraterritorial effect, in its collision course with prin-
ciples of comity, is far less easily justified under section 40 of the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law than are the extensions of the
antitrust laws. The national interests in enforcing the FCPA, as stated
by the Senate, involve the prestige of democracy, confidence in the
financial integrity of corporations, and the efficient functioning of capi-
tal markets.66 Yet, regardless of the importance to the national interest
perceived by the Senate to be attached to the enforcement of the
FCPA, the fact remains that the FCPA indirectly compels foreign per-
sons, entities, and sovereigns to conform their foreign activities to the
provisions of American law. In this instance, section 40 suggests as a
matter of international law the conclusion that the effect of the FCPA is
illegal, and that the United States must "consider, in good faith, mod-
erating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction." Thus, questions
arise as to the FCPA's ultimate desirability in its present form67 when
65. Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 460.
66. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
67. The proposals by France to the United Nations Economic and Social Council for a
convention on the elimination of bribery in international commercial transactions would
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considering that, while inhibiting corrupt practices, the FCPA also en-
gages in legal brinksmanship with basic principles of international law
which will undoubtedly produce serious international distemper. Fur-
thermore, the FCPA's creation of a jurisdictional subterfuge places
American parent-issuers in such a position of uncertainty as to their
potential liabilities that the FCPA will undoubtedly contribute to di-
minishing American commercial activity abroad.
limit the scope of any law or treaty prohibiting bribery to cover only those international
sales or contract transactions in which bribery or extortion is used to consummate the sale or
contract. This proposal focuses on the egregious cases of bribery and extortion, without
offending principles of international law. See 2 U.N. ESCOR. Annex (Agenda Item 9),
U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (1979).
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To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to make it unlawful for
an issuer of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of such Act
or an issuer required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of
such Act to make certain payments to foreign officials and other
foreign persons, to require such issuers to maintain accurate
records, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
TITLE I-FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977."
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
SEC. 102. Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78q(b)) is amended by inserting "(1)" after "(b)" and by adding
at the end thereof the following:
"(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursu-
ant to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall-
"(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
"(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting con-
trols sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that-
"(i) transactions are executed in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization;
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria appli-
cable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability
for assets;
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"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization; and
"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropri-
ate action is taken with respect to any differences.
"(3)(A) With respect to matters concerning the national security
of the United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of this
subsection shall be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation
with the head of any Federal department or agency responsible for
such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of a department
or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of the head of
such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority to issue
such directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph shall set
forth the specific facts and circumstances with respect to which the pro-
visions of this paragraph are to be invoked. Each such directive shall,
unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date of issuance.
"(B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United
States who issues a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall maintain
a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of each
year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives in force
at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate."
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY ISSUERS
SEC. 103. (a) The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by
inserting after section 30 the following new section:
"FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY ISSUERS
"SEC. 30A. (a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a
class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or which
is required to file reports under section 15(d) of this title, or for any
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder
thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in further-
ance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the pay-
ment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value to-
"(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign of-
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ficial in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to per-
form his official functions; or
"(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence
with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect
or influence, any act or decision of such government or instru-
mentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person;
"(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any can-
didate for foreign political office for purposes of-
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, offi-
cial, or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a
decision to fail to perform its or his official functions; or
"(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its
or his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person; or
"(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know
that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be of-
fered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign offi-
cial, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any
candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of-
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign of-
ficial, political party, party official, or candidate in his or its
official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or
its official functions; or
"(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in
order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing business to, any person.
"(b) As used in this section, the term "foreign official" means any
officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a foreign
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government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof
whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical."
(b)(1) Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78ff(a)) is amended by inserting "(other than section 30A)" im-
mediately after "title" the first place it appears.
(2) Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78fl) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
section:
"(c)(1) Any issuer which violates section 30A(a) of this title shall,
upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000.
"(2) Any officer or director of an issuer, or any stockholder act-
ing on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates section 30A(a) of
this title shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(3) Whenever an issuer is found to have violated section 30A(a)
of this title, any employee or agent of such issuer who is a United States
citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States (other than an officer, director, or stockholder of such
issuer), and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting
such violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of
this subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or
agent of an issuer, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, by
such issuer.".
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY DOMESTIC CONCERNS
SEC. 104. (a) It shall be unlawful for any domistic concern, other than
an issuer which is subject to section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, or any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic
concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic
concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer,
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value
to-
(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign offi-
cial in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to per-
form his official functions; or
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(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence
with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect
or influence any act or decision of such government or instru-
mentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any can-
didate for foreign political office for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, offi-
cial, or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a
decision to fail to perform its or his official functions; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its
or his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality,
in order assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know
that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be of-
fered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign offi-
cial, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any
candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign offi-
cial, political party, party official, or candidate in his or its
official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or
its official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any domestic
concern which violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined
not more than $1,000,000.
(B) Any individual who is a domestic concern and who willfully
violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(2) Any officer or director of a domestic concern, or stockholder
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates sub-
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section (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(3) Whenever a domestic concern is found to have violated sub-
section (a) of this section, any employee or agent of such domestic con-
cern who is a United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than an officer,
director, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic concern),
and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such viola-
tion shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this
subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or agent
of a domestic concern, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly,
by such domestic concern.
(c) Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any domes-
tic concern, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder thereof,
is engaged, or is about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a
violation of subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney General may, in
his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the
United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper showing
a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary restraining order
shall be granted without bond.
(d) As used in this section:
(1) The term "domestic concern" means (A) any individual
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B)
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States
or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
(2) The term "foreign official" means any officer or em-
ployee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.
(3) The term "interstate commerce" means trade, com-
merce, transportation, or communication among the several States,
or between any foreign country and any State or between any
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State and any place or ship outside thereof. Such term includes
the intrastate use of (A) a telephone or other interstate means of
communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.
Approved December 19, 1977.
